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Abstract
The dead donor rule holds that removing organs from living human beings with-
out their consent is wrongful killing. The rule still prevails in most countries, and 
I assume it without argument in order to pose the question: is it possible to have 
a metaphysically correct, clinically relevant analysis of human death that makes 
organ donation ethically permissible? I argue that the two dominant criteria of 
death—brain death and circulatory death—are both empirically and metaphysically 
inadequate as definitions of human death and therefore hold no epistemic value in 
themselves. I first set out a neo-Aristotelian theory of death as separation of soul 
(understood as organising principle) and body, which is then fleshed out as loss of 
organismic integrity. The brain and circulatory criteria are shown to have severe 
weaknesses as physiological manifestations of loss of integrity. Given the mismatch 
between what death is, metaphysically speaking, and the dominant criteria accepted 
by clinicians and philosophers, it turns out that only actual bodily decomposition is 
a sure sign of death. In this I differ from Alan Shewmon, whose important work I 
discuss in detail.
Keywords Death · Brain death · Organ donation · Bodily integration · 
Hylemorphism
Introduction
Is it possible to have a metaphysically correct, clinically relevant analysis of human 
death that makes organ donation possible? The enormous difficulty of finding an 
answer to this question is matched only by the grave ethical implications any answer 
will have. Considering that the first human organ transplant was performed in 1954 
and that in 2015 over 126,000 were performed worldwide [1], there can be no sur-
prise at the exertions made by clinicians and many bioethicists to secure as many 
organs as possible so as to give life and health to as many people as possible.
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Of the various ethical problems to which transplantation gives rise, the problem 
of death is in my view the most pressing. The dead donor rule, as it is called, still 
prevails in most countries: vital organs must only be removed from dead patients [2]. 
In other words, removing vital organs must not itself cause the death of the patient 
[3, p. 297].1 The problem, though, is that ‘the tension between the need for both 
“live organs” and a “dead donor” has required the development of very explicit cri-
teria for declaring the “moment” of death, despite the absence of a biological basis 
for this degree of precision’ [4, p. 106]. The two most common criteria of death 
are ‘whole brain death’ and ‘circulatory death’, both enshrined in the 1980 Uniform 
Determination of Death Act [5]. Yet there is a welter of disagreement among clini-
cians and ethicists as to which, if any, criterion is correct and why. Whole brain 
death—consisting in the “irreversible cessation of all functions of the entire brain, 
including the brain stem” [5, §1]2—still holds sway as the favoured standard for 
determining the death of the human being.3 It has, however, come under persistent 
pressure from its critics, most notably Alan Shewmon (e.g., [11–13]) and Robert 
Truog [14, ch. 3]. Some of its defenders, perhaps surprisingly, consider themselves 
Thomists and hold that the test is consistent with the Scholastic metaphysics exem-
plified by Thomas Aquinas [15, 16]. Other Thomists have rejected this attempted 
reconciliation of Thomistic metaphysics with the whole brain criterion [17].
My purpose here is not to take on the large task of evaluating the whole brain 
criterion in all its aspects, let alone to investigate the various other criteria that have 
been proposed. Rather, I examine some important issues surrounding the whole 
brain and related criteria. The debate is currently sagging both under the weight 
of empirical and diagnostic information appealed to by partisans of the various 
sides, arguments, and counter-arguments and under what seems to me a general 
anxiety over the lack of consensus concerning what death is, how it is determined, 
and whether human beings even need, ethically, to be dead before their organs are 
removed.
It is not possible to approach these questions all together, nor is it desirable to do 
so. I have to make certain assumptions, which may limit the appeal of what I argue. 
I assume without argument that the dead donor rule is ethically correct: removing 
(vital) organs from living human beings—at least without their consent4—is not 
merely as good as wrongfully killing them; it is wrongfully killing them. I make 
no distinction between the human person and the human being, as some do [18]. I 
further assume a broadly Aristotelian metaphysic of the human being. That is, the 
human being is a compound of form and matter, where form is, to put it as neu-
trally as possible, the ‘organising principle’ that unifies matter into a functioning, 
1 This is assuming, of course, that the patient is not killed before their organs are taken.
2 Cf. the ‘higher brain’ criterion—that death is the irreversible cessation of consciousness [6], albeit this 
broad criterion is understood in many different ways.
3 It was, of course, the President’s Commission for the Study of Ethical Problems in Medicine [7] that 
gave whole brain death its canonical status and continued widespread acceptance. Its most prominent 
defender is James Bernat; see, e.g., [8, 9], along with the highly influential [10].
4 My own view is that even with consent, this would be a wrongful killing, but that is another matter that 
need not detain us here.
1 3
Death, unity, and the brain 
integrated whole. There is no need to assume that the human form—which Aris-
totelians call the soul (psuchê)—survives a human’s death. Rather, I take such an 
assumption to be irrelevant for present purposes. The only metaphysical loading, 
as it were, that is given to the term soul in the present analysis is that of organising 
or unifying principle. I also understand the human being as an essentially rational 
animal—a being for whom the power of rational thought is present as long as it is a 
normal member of its kind, just as being winged is essential to birds as long as they 
are normal members of their kind.5 Again, however, the present discussion does not 
rely on this understanding.
I have suggested that these assumptions may limit the value of the following dis-
cussion, but that would depend on how much specificity is packed into the assump-
tions. If one thinks that they cannot even be rendered plausible without taking on a 
raft of contentious ethics or metaphysics, then the discussion may indeed have lim-
ited appeal. I am not so sure. Stripped of any tendentious terminology, one does 
not have to be an Aristotelian or an unqualified defender of the sanctity of life to 
find merit in the following ideas: killing people for their organs is wrong; human 
beings and human people are one and the same; humans are distinctively rational 
beings; what makes an organism a living member of its kind is its functional unity 
and integrity. Taken in this relatively ‘thin’ way, the assumptions—and the analysis I 
offer using them as my starting point—are worthy of consideration even if the reader 
does not share a particularly Aristotelian way of understanding the world. That said, 
I frame my case in an unapologetically Aristotelian-Thomistic fashion, in the hope 
that the reader will find some merit in the more detailed metaphysical framework I 
adopt (along with not a few other writers in the debate over death).
With this background in place, I proceed as follows. First, I set out the proper 
Aristotelian understanding of death as soul–body separation. This understanding is 
then applied to the idea of death as the loss of integrity. Next comes a considera-
tion of the popular view that the brain is the integrator of the human being, the idea 
being that if the brain ceases to function, then the organism ipso facto loses integrity 
and is therefore dead. I then examine the alternative theory that ‘circulatory death’ 
is the death of the human being. Next, I look at important questions concerning irre-
versibility: is it necessary for death, and if so, can irreversibility ever be verified? 
My conclusions will not be of much assistance to advocates of organ transplanta-
tion who accept the dead donor rule, given the sure criterion of death that I end 
up proposing—but this is not my concern. More encouragingly, my proposal does 
not preclude the future technical possibility of respecting the dead donor rule while 
maintaining a supply of usable organs.
5 The wings have not been amputated, for instance.
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Death as separation
Death, put simply, is the separation of the soul from the body. This does not imply 
either that the soul continues to exist after death or that it does not. As far as the pre-
sent discussion goes, it implies only that death is the loss of the body’s organising 
principle. A clay statue ceases to exist when it loses its shape, but the shape does not 
continue to exist. Nor does the idea of death as separation imply that the body con-
tinues to exist after death. Following Aristotle, the post-mortem body is the body of 
a dead person in name only. In reality, the body has been replaced by a lump of flesh 
on the way to carrion. When a statue is smashed to bits, its form is separated from its 
matter, but neither the form nor the lump of clay continues to exist.6 True, we do not 
typically say that a statue’s lump of clay has been separated from its shape, but this 
is what the loss amounts to. Now, a statue is not a substance but an artefact, so its 
form is not substantial but accidental (albeit essential—part of its essence is to have 
a certain accident, in the Aristotelian sense).7 And its form is just its shape. Neither 
of these facts is true of humans, but the general point applies: a form and its matter 
can be separated without the form’s surviving. When a non-human animal dies, it 
too suffers the separation of form and matter, but there is no reason therein for think-
ing that its form survives.
The death of the human being consists, then, in nothing other than the loss of his 
form; to die is, simply, to lose your soul—understood as your metaphysical principle 
of organisation or unity. Is this loss or separation gradual or instantaneous?8 The 
answer is that it depends, since loss or separation can mean either (i) the process of 
losing or separating or (ii) the coming to be of the result of this process—its culmi-
nation. The process, by definition, has to be gradual. Being gradual does not entail 
being slow (relative to some standard) or prolonged, but simply taking place over a 
temporal interval. Hence most if not all of the cases called sudden death—say, by 
electric shock or powerful trauma—are (or at least could be) absolutely gradual yet 
relatively sudden by comparison to, for example, drowning or poisoning.
Separation as the culmination of the process—the event of becoming dead, 
strictly speaking—has, however, to be instantaneous. Even without an underlying 
hylemorphic ontology, whereby the organism is a form-matter compound, it is hard 
to see how life and death can be other than all or nothing.9 What could it mean to be 
partially dead? An organism might be partly dead, say, by having necrotic tissue or 
a nerveless tooth; but an organism that is partially dead would have to engage simul-
taneously in the behaviour of a living thing and the behaviour of a dead thing, and if 
being dead means not existing, the organism would have to behave in ways consist-
ent both with its existing and not existing—which is absurd. If life and death are all 
8 Henceforth, I use the terms loss and separation interchangeably.
9 The same view is expressed by David Jones [20, p. 138], whose article presents a brief but useful sum-
mary of some of the key issues I explore here.
6 Thanks to Michael Sherwin for making me realise that what I say about the possible non-persistence of 
form after separation from matter applies pari passu to the matter itself.
7 For more on this, see [19, ch. 7.4].
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or nothing, therefore, the event of becoming dead—the culmination of the process 
of dying—cannot obtain via a series of stages in which an organism starts off alive 
and then undergoes stages of partial death until it is wholly dead. Yet for the event 
of becoming dead not to be instantaneous (i.e., to be gradual), the organism would 
have to pass through such a series of stages. Otherwise, how else could the outcome 
be achieved gradually?
No counterexample to my claim is to be found in the case of a body gradually 
consumed by, say, gangrene or some toxin that progressively destroys the tissue. 
This would be a clear case of gradual dying—separation in sense (i) above—but 
not of gradual death—separation in sense (ii). One should agree with Shewmon’s 
endorsement [13, p. 429] of James Bernat and colleagues’ distinction between the 
‘whole organism’ and the ‘organism as a whole’ [10, p. 390]. An organism can lose 
parts, or it can endure the disintegration of function or components in a localised 
region, and so not be a whole organism according to the standards of the kind to 
which it belongs—standards including material constitution and function both at a 
time and over time. Yet it can still retain its status as an organism—a being that, 
overall or as a whole, given the relevant standards, maintains the essential unity of 
constitution and function without which it would otherwise cease to exist altogether. 
An organism slowly consumed by gangrene is every bit as alive as a healthy one, 
the difference consisting in how close to death each one is. Dead parts do not of 
themselves render an organism dead. Moreover, this is just what should be expected 
from a hylemorphic understanding of life. An organism’s matter is informed: it is 
organised, structured, and determined as an entity of a specific kind with a charac-
teristic repertoire of behaviour and operation. Given that what does the organising 
is a real metaphysical principle—a universal form particularised in some matter—it 
is hard to see how the form could be only partly present. How could it inform some 
but not all of the organism? Moreover, informing all of the organism means inform-
ing every single part of the organism down to the smallest sub-atomic parts. If it did 
not do so, then we would have to say that the putative parts that were not informed 
by the organismic form were not parts of the organism at all. Gut or skin bacteria, 
for instance, no matter how strong their symbiotic relationship to the host symbiont 
organism, are not literal parts of that organism because they are not informed by 
the organism’s own form. Moreover, denying the all-or-nothing nature of the organ-
ism’s informance10 by its form is almost certainly inconsistent with the doctrine of 
the unicity of substantial form—the distinctively Thomistic doctrine, based on good 
Aristotelian reasons, that there is one and only one substantial form, or more loosely 
organising principle, for each individual substance.11 For the obvious (at least to an 
Aristotelian) way of maintaining that an organism can be only partially informed 
by its organismic substantial form would be to hold that some part of that organ-
ism was informed only by a vegetative or sensitive form but not by the higher form 
proper to the organism. To put it non-Scholastically, the idea is that in a human, say, 
10 I apologise for the quasi-neologism, which has a brief pedigree of much older usage in this context 
and captures what I intend to say far better than the ambiguous term information.
11 For defence of this doctrine, see [19, pp. 68–71].
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some parts are merely vegetative or sensitive (merely animal) but not fully human, 
while other parts are fully human. This might be possible for some kind of freakish, 
Frankensteinian creation, but I have no idea how it could apply to a real, unitary 
organism such as a human being. To what vegetative or animal kind would these 
‘partially human’ parts belong, biologically speaking? Their DNA would be human, 
and mere damage or malfunction would not be sufficient to deprive them of their 
human identity. I will not spend any longer on this rather fanciful way of defending 
partial informance, leaving the defender of a plurality of forms to make sense of it.
So, if one takes together: the idea of death as separation; the notion that separa-
tion is an event distinct from the process leading up to it; the view that hylemorphic 
composition—at least in the case of organisms—is all or nothing; and the recogni-
tion that one clear way of denying it requires also denying the doctrine of unicity; 
there is, then, a strong case for regarding death as instantaneous.12 It is not for noth-
ing that the expression ‘the moment of death’ has a long history. Hence one should 
not misinterpret the Jesuit moral theologian Juan Ferreres, who in his important 
early twentieth-century work says: ‘in general we may hold as universally admit-
ted that death does not invade the entire organism suddenly, but only gradually, the 
separation of soul and body taking place some time after the man is usually said to 
be dead’ [21, p. 58]. Immediately following, he adds: ‘That there exists a longer or 
shorter period of life between the actual moment of death and that ordinarily sup-
posed to be indicated as such by certain symptoms is generally admitted’ [21, pp. 
58–59]. He then refers to Jean Laborde, whose significant early work on resusci-
tation occupies a large part of Ferreres’ book; Laborde speaks of ‘the moment at 
which the spark of life is totally and finally extinct’ [21, p. 59].
Death as disintegration
There is, however, an immediate challenge to the idea of the moment of death as a 
genuine moment. Most, it seems, of the dead donor rule’s defenders stress the cen-
trality of integrity to organismic life. Whether they support the whole brain death 
criterion or not, they agree that the loss of integrity of the organism is the biological 
fact in which death consists. The disagreement, of course, is over whether that fact 
should be equated with the fact of whole brain death or some other fact.13
The challenge is that integrity—or integration, which is the more common 
term—looks like it is not an all-or-nothing matter, meaning that loss of integrity 
13 Those who highlight integrity include Shewmon [11, 13] and elsewhere [7, 10, 15–17, 22].
12 Does my argument imply that death could never be identified with a physiological process, given that 
all processes are gradual? I think this is the case, but it still does not rule out the identification of death 
with a physiological event, as long as the event were truly instantaneous and entailed the immediate tran-
sition of the organism from the state of integrity to the state of non-integrity. I am not convinced that 
there are any genuinely instantaneous events of a purely physical (or physiological) nature. But even if 
there were—envisioning, perhaps, some kind of sub-atomic or quantum transition—it would then need to 
be shown that such an event had anything whatsoever to do with organismic integrity. The task would be 
difficult, to say the least. I leave such explorations to another occasion.
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must be gradual and so cannot be instantaneous. This appearance is lent support by 
the ways in which supporters of integrity formulate the phenomenon. Shewmon, for 
example, speaks of integrity as ‘the anti-entropic mutual interaction of all the cells 
and tissues of the body, mediated in mammals by circulating oxygenated blood’ [11, 
p. 473]. Nicholas Tonti-Filippini speaks of ‘intercommunication between the parts 
in such a way that the body remain[s] a functional whole’ and says that ‘the parts of 
the whole are intercommunicative with each other as a dynamic unity,’ something 
which, he notes, can be ‘partial’ [22, pp. 321, 318, 319]. Again, Bernat et al. hold 
that ‘the spontaneous and innate interrelationship of all or most of the remaining 
subsystems and the interaction of the perhaps impaired organism with its environ-
ment is to be regarded as the functioning of the organism as a whole,’ where func-
tioning is equated with the integrity of the organism [10, p. 390].
I could multiply instances but the point is clear enough. If integrity is understood 
in terms of intercommunication or transfer of information between parts and sub-
systems, the interaction of the organism with its environment, and the like, then it 
is hard to see how integrity has to be all or nothing. Not all parts need receive all 
biologically normal kinds of communication—for example, a paralysed limb will 
not receive nerve impulses, and nerve signals might be present in some parts where 
circulation is severely compromised. Not only can integration gradually be lost, it 
might be thought, but there can also be no moment marking the leap from life to 
death since there is no moment marking the leap from integration to non-integration. 
Proponents of integration as communication do not, as far as I can tell, identify the 
moment of death as the leap from the cessation of the final organismic system or 
information transfer process left functioning to the absence of all such systems or 
processes. Even if proponents of this view made such an identification, the fact that 
the last system—whatever it might be—does not itself shut down instantaneously 
would still make the transition from life to death non-instantaneous, on this view.14
Given this mismatch between loss of integration as a biological phenomenon and 
separation as a metaphysical one, it is exceedingly difficult to see how the two could 
be identified. Might it be enough that they were co-extensive, perhaps necessarily 
so? In this case, would integration not be an acceptable epistemic criterion or test 
of separation? The problem, though, is that there is no reason to think that any par-
ticular kind or degree of loss of integration, on the intercommunication model, is the 
phenomenon whose co-extensiveness with separation is required here. And that is 
another reason for not identifying such loss with separation of body and soul. Just 
what is the biological phenomenon in question? When one looks for communication 
and transfer of information between parts and sub-systems, why are such phenom-
ena considered metaphysically important?
The answer, according to the hylemorphic theory, is that these phenomena are 
marks of integrity in the all-or-nothing sense. The idea of ‘the organism as a whole’, 
of course, gestures in just the right direction, so it is not as though integration 
theorists are missing the point. But they should not focus on intercommunication 
between parts, which is a matter of degree and comes in many kinds. Otherwise, 
14 Cardiac arrest, for instance, does not entail the instantaneous cessation of all circulatory function.
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there is no obstacle in the way of holding that declining integration is just gradual 
death (rather than gradual dying) and that if enough, but not all, systems shut down 
or stop interacting, the human being is not fully alive, or is ‘as good as dead’—per-
haps good enough for organs to be removed.
Integrity is all or nothing.15 Either the organism is a whole or it is not; the con-
cept of a partial whole, at least for organisms, makes no sense. When the body is 
informed, integrity is present and there is a whole organism; when form is lost, so is 
integrity and no organism remains at all. This is how form works—it unifies matter 
into a substantial whole and permeates every part of the substance; my big toe is as 
much me (as long as it is attached and functioning) as my head or, for that matter, 
my brain. The same goes for an individual red blood cell or a single neuron. Form 
reaches into every part of the organism; if it did not do so, an organism would be an 
accidental unity—a complex of at least two substances or of a substance and at least 
one accident. An organism as a whole remains so even when it is less than a whole 
organism.16 Loss of integration, in the sense of intercommunication, should make 
no more difference to integrity in the all-or-nothing, hylemorphic sense than should 
amputation.
Given this metaphysical approach to death, the concept of death as disintegra-
tion needs to be handled with extreme care. For one must not confuse the all-or-
nothing, instantaneous loss of integrity in which death consists with one or other 
process whereby the parts and subsystems of an organism cease, perhaps gradually, 
to function one by one. Moreover, there is a third concept of disintegration which 
must be kept separate—disintegration as the literal physical separation of parts of 
an organism. It is my contention that disintegration as systemic failure—the second 
concept—can only occur prior to disintegration as loss of integrity, which is true 
metaphysical death. Further, disintegration as physical separation can occur either 
prior or subsequently to true metaphysical death. Epistemically, systemic failure is, 
of course, a fallible sign of dying, whether or not the organism in fact dies. Physical 
separation is also a fallible sign of dying when it occurs prior to death. And when it 
occurs after death, it is a sign—this time infallible—that the organism has died. The 
third concept of disintegration—physical separation—plays a far more important 
role in the debate over organ donation than so far acknowledged by any side. I return 
to this towards the end, but first I need to consider the challenge that the brain death 
criterion poses to the approach I have outlined, followed by the role of the circula-
tory test as, perhaps, more congenial to the hylemorphic theory.
Is the brain the integrator? Empirical objections
Within the long-running, overall debate as to whether brain death is death of the 
human lies the sub-debate as to whether the brain is the integrator of the human 
organism. Defenders of the brain death criterion who agree that death is a loss of 
15 Shewmon [13, p. 468] is, in my view, completely correct.
16 Agreeing again with Shewmon [13, p. 429], following [10].
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bodily integrity argue that said integrity is lost when the whole brain ceases to func-
tion, precisely because the brain is the integrator of the organism [6, p. 35; 10; 16; 
22; 23]. As one defender of brain integration puts it, ‘without the brain, the body 
loses its form, so to speak, as the parts cease to be an integrated dynamic unity’ [22, 
p. 313]. Or, in less high-flown terms and without the semi-Aristotelianism:
A moment’s reflection discloses that it is primarily the brain that is responsible 
for the functioning of the organism as a whole: the integration of organ and 
tissue subsystems by neural and neuroendocrine control of temperature, flu-
ids and electrolytes, nutrition, breathing, circulation, appropriate responses to 
danger, among others. The cardiac arrest patient with whole brain destruction 
is simply a preparation of unintegrated individual subsystems, since the organ-
ism as a whole has ceased functioning. [24, p. 48]17
Note that I am not concerned here with the distinct position that brain death (whether 
whole or part) is human death because the brain is the ‘seat of consciousness’ or 
‘locus of personhood’, or a similar notion.18 I find such views highly implausible, 
and they would in any case require separate evaluation. Rather, my concern is with 
the popular idea that the functioning brain is a kind of ‘master part’ that integrates 
the body and so is a necessary condition of the very existence of the human being.
The integrator theory, for all its prima facie plausibility, faces enormous problems 
apart from the general ones affecting all whole brain theories—such as the virtual 
impossibility of determining that the entire brain has ceased functioning. First, it 
is necessary to know whether the integrator theory is an empirical or metaphysical 
theory. Is it that physiology teaches that the brain is the integrator of the organism, 
or is it that one comes to this as a metaphysical view from empirical facts about the 
brain’s workings in respect of the organism? Neither interpretation is palatable.
Taken as an empirical theory—say, as the systematisation of a large number of 
pertinent empirical facts—the position has to be something like the following: the 
brain controls so many organism-level systems, processes, and states that when it 
ceases to do so, one simply cannot speak of there being an organism present at all. 
Specifically, ‘the intrinsically vital functions provided by the heart and other organs 
are wholly dependent on the cohesive and regulatory functions of the brain’ [25, 
p. 37] (quoted in [11, p. 463]). The problem with this view is that it has been thor-
oughly refuted on empirical grounds, as the extensive work of Shewmon has demon-
strated.19 As Franklin Miller and Robert Truog put it, ‘Shewmon has described how 
most of the brain’s functions are not directed toward integration of the organism, 
and how most of the integrative functions of the body do not require brain function’ 
[14, p. 65].20 For example, a variety of homeostatic processes take place in patients 
diagnosed as brain dead, along with metabolism and catabolism, wound healing, 
17 Cited also by Shewmon [11, pp. 462–463].
18 Patrick Lee and Germain Grisez [15] defend the consciousness (‘radical capacity for sentience’) view, 
while Robert Veatch [6] defends the personhood (‘higher brain’) view.
19 See in particular [11].
20 Also see [14, pp. 63–66] for discussion.
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immune responses, bodily growth, sexual maturation, and even gestation to term of 
a child inside a pregnant, brain-dead woman. Needless to say, not all of these pro-
cesses will be found in all patients diagnosed as brain dead, though I suspect that not 
a single patient so diagnosed, by any existing criterion, has failed to display at least 
one such characteristic.
There are many points that could be raised about these phenomena, but I want 
to highlight some of the most important. One is that it is always open to a critic to 
make the ‘no true Scotsman’ move against Shewmon: none of the patients in whom 
organism-level activity can be found is truly brain dead. It is not as though such a 
move would in itself be invalid if there were a definitive test that such patients actu-
ally failed to meet. And the information I am appealing to here derives from cases 
where, by and large, brain death was formally declared based on widely agreed upon 
criteria. Nevertheless, the criteria are not identical in every case, and the fact is that 
there is no single ‘gold standard’ test of brain death, which is a major concern. Per-
haps clinicians will, one day, rally around one clear criterion of brain death—but 
this merely places the onus on defenders of brain death to make their case. Until 
then, opponents can only rely on the tests—many of them extremely rigorous—
already in widespread use. This does not, however, allay the main worry—that is, 
whether any particular empirical fact is the fact of brain death. Must every last neu-
ron have ceased to function? Must no single neurotransmitter be working? There 
is nothing frivolous about the concern, as long as one thinks that there is a gulf 
between being ‘as good as dead’ and being actually dead. In one extreme case (of 
many that could be cited), a boy diagnosed as brain dead from meningitis at the age 
of four lived another twenty years at home on a ventilator. Autopsy revealed brain 
destruction with, as Miller and Truog put it, ‘an entirely calcified brain, with no 
neural elements visible either grossly or microscopically’ [14, p. 64].21 Is it that in 
chronic cases such as these scientists have not yet found the neurological component 
that continues to function in order for bodily integrity to be maintained?
Another point is that there is no conundrum when handling cases of organism-
level activity accompanied by brain death. One is not compelled to refine the neuro-
logical criterion in order to rule out such cases on empirical grounds—as opposed 
to organ demand-driven grounds. On the contrary, Shewmon offers many reasons 
for thinking that the survival of a human being with brain death is both possible and 
predictable, summed up in his theses: ‘(1) most brain-mediated integrative functions 
are actually not somatically integrating, and (2) most somatically integrative func-
tions are not, in fact, brain-mediated’ [11, p. 463]. To give but one important exam-
ple, it is well known that patients diagnosed as brain dead need to be mechanically 
ventilated. It cannot, however, be inferred from this that breathing—as an integra-
tive function—is brain mediated. Moving air in and out of the lungs is indeed brain 
mediated, but it is not integrative: it is absent in a foetus and bypassed altogether 
in cases of extracorporeal membrane oxygenation. On the other hand, breathing 
21 Here Miller and Truog refer to a case initially described by Shewmon [26, p. 1543] and later analysed 
by Susan Repertinger et al. [27, p. 594].
1 3
Death, unity, and the brain 
understood as the entire process of respiration—exchange of oxygen and carbon 
dioxide—is a whole-organism process that is not brain mediated [11, p. 464].
A criticism of Shewmon’s litany of non-brain-mediated integrative processes is 
that if any of the putative organism-level processes he appeals to can also be dem-
onstrated in independent cells or cultures outside the body, there is weaker support 
than might be thought for the idea that organismic integrity obtains despite brain 
death [23, pp. 258–259]. Clearly the clinical and physiological details are of para-
mount importance here, and it is true that the process of wound healing, for exam-
ple, is to some extent demonstrated ex vivo. But it is the extent that makes the differ-
ence. Ex vivo models of wound healing require complex preparations for the tissue 
samples (usually skin) to be viable. One study used incubation in foetal calf serum 
in order to see any healing at all [28]. As another study points out, lack of blood 
supply is a major limitation in ex vivo models [29]. The point is that such models 
will only ever be approximations rather than replications of what goes on when the 
organism repairs itself. The closer experimenters try to make their approximation, 
the more they have to mimic or substitute organismic processes, such as circulation 
and immune support. In other words, by mimicking organismic behaviour in order 
to have a reliable model, they tacitly admit that in vivo healing is a holistic process 
attributable to the organism rather than any of its parts. It invokes, as Shewmon puts 
it, ‘multiple bodily systems distant from the wound’ [11, p. 475].
The same point applies, even more clearly, to phenomena such as sexual matura-
tion, bodily growth, and maternal gestation to term in brain-dead patients. Are these 
not by necessity organism-level processes? There is no implicit circularity in appeal-
ing to them, since I am not speaking of, for example, maturation of the organism or 
gestation by the organism. Rather, it is first noted that certain processes can be iden-
tified in the body of a brain-dead patient. This observation then leaves an open ques-
tion as to whether the processes properly belong to an organism or to, as Shewmon 
colourfully puts it, ‘a mere “collection of organs” in a bag of skin’ [11, p. 473]. The 
processes of maturation, growth, and gestation all, on any reasonable interpretation 
of what is going on, require organisms to undergo them. They each require the inte-
grated functioning of numerous organismic systems (e.g., cardio-respiratory, endo-
crine, nervous, immune, and lymphatic), along with all the homeostatic processes 
(e.g., temperature and fluid level regulation) that belong to these and other systems 
and components.22
What of the objection from ectogenesis? Gestation to term in artificial wombs, 
for mammals up to and possibly including humans, is only a matter of time.23 Would 
22 Maureen Condic lists, without further explanation, sexual maturation as having ‘components’ observ-
able in ‘cells or tissues ex vivo’, and ‘proportional growth’ as observable in ‘organ culture’ [23, p. 259]. 
As to the first, it is hard to know what she is talking about, other than perhaps the observation of, say, a 
tissue culture sprouting pubic hair or some such. This would not be sexual maturation of the kind seen in 
a paradigmatic living organism, merely one small aspect of it in one part of the body. As to the second, 
the growth of an organ in culture is not the bodily growth seen in paradigmatic living organisms. What 
has been found in brain-dead patients is, however impaired or reduced, of the same kind as found in para-
digmatic living organisms, not tissue or organ cultures.
23 See Emily Partridge et al. [30] on the artificial gestation of lambs for four weeks.
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this not show that gestation to term is an essentially non-organismic process? I do 
not see how this follows. Just as with wound healing or skin growth in culture, 
ectogenesis only ever approximates to what a living organism does when it gestates 
offspring. In vivo, there are continual exchanges between the mother and the child. 
The offspring makes changes to the mother’s body, immune system, and so on. 
There is no such exchange in ectogenesis. I have not seen evidence of its occurrence 
in brain-death gestation cases, but it would be remarkable were it wholly absent, 
since viable delivery in such cases requires the mother to be somatically prepared, as 
it were, for the process to take place. An artificial womb no more demonstrates the 
non-organismic status of natural gestation than does an incubator.
Is the brain the integrator? Theoretical objections
In addition to the largely empirical objections raised against the brain-as-integrator 
thesis, there are serious theoretical or conceptual problems. The first, only hinted 
at but not exploited by Shewmon [11, p. 473], is based on the simple fact that the 
human organism does not begin its existence with a brain. Neural progenitor cells—
the stem cells capable of producing, but not yet actually producing, all the cells 
of the brain—do not even appear until the third week after fertilisation. The three 
primary structures—forebrain, midbrain, and hindbrain—are not formed until the 
fourth week, along with the spinal cord.24 I do not intend to defend here the proposi-
tion that the human organism exists in the third and fourth weeks after fertilisation; 
I take it for granted. But if the human organism can and does exist without a brain at 
some time during its life, how can the brain be the integrator?
There does not seem to be any appealing, non-question-begging way out for 
the defender of the brain-as-integrator thesis. To say that the brain is the integra-
tor, albeit not essential, will not do. For what could this amount to? If it is a non-
essential integrator, then the organism can persist without it, and absent independent 
reasons for thinking this never happens apart from embryogenesis, the claim either 
begs the question or proves nothing. There is simply no good reason, given the clear 
existence of living human organisms without brains, to think that whenever the brain 
is functioning it is also integrating. On the other hand, the defender might make a 
modified essentialist claim to the effect that the brain must be the integrator when it 
is present and functioning. What would be the ground for that? Perhaps it is the idea 
that once the brain has formed, the organism has reached a certain threshold level 
of complexity that requires integration by a master organ. Again, however, it is hard 
to see how this could be more than mere assertion. What level of complexity could 
constitute this threshold? The natural thought is that it has something to do with dif-
ferentiation within the organism: the more the cells develop specific functions, the 
more the organism develops specialised organs and body parts, and the more com-
plex it becomes. Suppose that were true: how would it follow that an integrator was 
necessary? What reason is there to think that the organism as a whole is incapable 
24 For a detailed account, see [31].
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of maintaining all of the specialised organs and functions in a cohesive (even if 
impaired) network of mutually sustaining interactions? In any case, the complexity 
claim understood in terms of differentiation is false: even by the fourth day after fer-
tilisation, the embryonic blastomeres are differentiating into the inner cell mass and 
the trophoblasts. If the critic objects that the trophoblasts become extra-embryonic 
structures and so are not part of intra-embryonic differentiation (a specious point, in 
my view), consider that by the ninth day—still well before the appearance of neu-
ral progenitor cells—the inner cell mass itself differentiates into epiblast and hypo-
blast.25 So differentiation and specialisation start well before brain formation and 
continue long after. One is, then, still left without a reason for thinking that there is 
some special level of complexity that requires a master part to take over as integrator 
in the life of the human organism.
Another serious theoretical objection is briefly mentioned by Michel Accad but 
not stressed nearly enough [17, p. 222]: what integrates the integrator? After all, 
the functioning brain itself has the integrity of an organ, so why does it not have 
its own integrator—some privileged portion of the brain that integrates the whole? 
The defender of the brain-as-integrator thesis can, of course, deny subscribing to the 
view that every organism, let alone every organ, requires an integrator. He would be 
right to deny this, since many organisms (and their organs) lack integrators—plants 
being an obvious example.26 But he would still need to give a well-motivated reason 
for thinking that in the human case, where the organism does, on his view, require 
an integrator, the latter does not need its own integrator—which is to say, a master 
part within the organ. After all, if the thought is that the human organism is the sort 
of thing that needs a master part—whether because of the amount or kind of com-
plexity or because of some other special feature of its operations—it would be hard 
to deny the same of the brain itself.
The primary problem with requiring an integrator for the brain itself is not that it 
sets up an infinite regress—something Accad points out [17, p. 222], and a serious 
problem nonetheless—but that it betrays a misunderstanding of the whole phenome-
non of integrity. On the hylemorphic theory, every single part of the organism, down 
to its very cellular and even chemical constituents, is governed by its form. To repeat 
my earlier claim, I am as much a human being in my little toe as in my whole body. 
Everything in the human organism partakes of the human form—and this is not a 
mere point about DNA. The brain gets whatever functional capacity it has from the 
very source of all other functional capacity in the organism—the organism’s form. 
This is demonstrated in the order of efficient causality by the brain’s emergence, as 
pointed out earlier, from the embryonic developmental process. It is as much a prod-
uct of the organism’s integral functioning as the hair that ends up growing on the 
organism’s head. Every part of the organism is the product of a single developmen-
tal plan. As such, I submit that it is utterly confused to think that the product of an 
organism’s integrity could ever be or become the producer of that integrity.
26 Contra Joshua Hoffman and Gary Rosenkrantz [33, 34].
25 For details, see Gary Schoenwolf et al. [32, ch. 1].
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Circulation—a holistic replacement for the integrator thesis?
I hope I have said enough to show the untenability of the proposition that the brain 
is the integrator of the organism. As a mainstay of the brain death criterion, the 
latter is severely weakened thereby. Coupled with my earlier discussion, I have pro-
vided strong reasons for thinking that brain death is not the death of the organism. In 
this I am in full accord with Shewmon and others.
Yet might not the wrongness of the brain death criterion simply invite the search 
for a criterion of death that is genuinely holistic? If there were an authentic, organ-
ism-level process whose cessation entailed the loss of integrity, then one would have 
such an empirical criterion. It is no surprise that ‘cardio-respiratory’ or ‘circulatory-
respiratory’ death, as it is sometimes called, is often appealed to in this regard. (I 
will henceforth refer simply to ‘circulatory’ death.)
As is well known, circulatory criteria were part of the standard of death in most 
countries before the advent of brain-based criteria. Traditionally, loss of heartbeat, 
or pulse, or breathing, have been taken as essential signs of death. Contrary to wide-
spread belief, however, none of these signs, taken together or individually, were 
ever considered sufficient for death.27 In the pre-organ donation age, people were far 
more concerned to ensure that individuals were dead before they were buried or cre-
mated. Loss of sensation, lack of reflexes, absence of spontaneous movement, and 
more extreme signs, to which I turn shortly, were all part and parcel of the overall 
determination of death.
Given the challenges to the still-dominant brain death criterion, circulatory death 
has emerged as a standard of death on its own terms, and as of 2018 12% of United 
States organ donors were diagnosed as dead by circulatory criteria, up from 2% in 
2003.28 As with brain death, there is no test of circulatory death that is agreed upon 
in all details, and patient behaviour varies widely. Once the ventilator is removed, a 
patient’s heart might continue beating for ten to twenty minutes, and up to several 
hours [36]. Diagnosis of cardiac death is given around two to five minutes after the 
heart has stopped beating [39, p. 3]. Rigor mortis and lividity, however, do not begin 
until at least thirty minutes after the heart stops [40, ch. 1], a point to which I return 
below.
This variability notwithstanding, one might think that circulatory death is a more 
promising candidate for the physiological fact that marks the moment of organismic 
death. Shewmon himself seems to think so.29 He considers the full cardio-respira-
tory-circulatory system—not just the beating heart or pumping lungs, but everything 
down to the last capillaries—to be genuinely holistic, an irreducibly organism-level 
property. In contrast to the brain, he asserts, ‘circulation … does reach essentially 
everywhere, and the few structures without capillaries communicate with the nearest 
capillaries by diffusion’ [13, p. 465].
27 See further Dick Teresi [35, pp. 77, 88, 90].
28 Data calculated from statistics of the United States Department of Health and Human Services 
[37, 38].
29 See, for example, [11, pp. 469, 473; 13, pp. 465–467].
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Moreover, Shewmon comes very close to endorsing cessation of circulation as 
the biological sign of the moment of death. He calls it a ‘probably valid criterion’ 
and an ‘anatomical substrate’ that is ‘close to the moment of death’, specifying the 
following: ‘cessation of circulation of blood for a sufficient time … to produce irre-
versible damage to a critical number of organs and tissues throughout the body, so 
that an irrevocable process of disintegration has begun’ [41, p. 250]. At the same 
time, Shewmon recognises that ‘there could be many possible valid criteria … that a 
person has already died. But the closer one tries to get to the unobservable moment 
of death itself, the more difficult it becomes to formulate a universally valid and cer-
tain criterion’ [41, p. 250].
There is a lot to like about what Shewmon says here, but also a serious prob-
lem. On the positive side, he adheres clearly to the idea of a metaphysical moment 
of death that is unobservable. He insists implicitly on organism-level properties or 
processes as candidates for a criterion of death. And his circulatory criterion is a far 
better candidate than brain death. Nevertheless, the flaw in his approach lies, first, 
in his appeal to terms such as ‘irreversible damage’ to critical organs and ‘an irrev-
ocable process of disintegration’, and second, in his claim that there is no single, 
universally valid sign of death, only more or less approximate criteria that can vary 
from case to case. Moreover, in another place he makes his position plain: ‘We find 
it far preferable to say that healthy, living organisms are obviously integrated unities, 
that decomposing corpses are obviously not unities, and that there is a fuzzy area in 
between that is intrinsically undecidable’ [42, p. 106].
The first problem concerns irreversibility. There has been a lot of discussion of 
the term, and Shewmon himself notes the various interpretations that it can be given 
[42, pp. 95–100]. It figures into most of the widely discussed or agreed upon defini-
tions of death (e.g., [7, 10, 43, 44]). Without entering into a detailed analysis of the 
different meanings of the term, I claim that any relevant interpretation will be either 
inadequate or question begging. Suppose irreversible means something as weak 
as ‘permanent’, where permanent cessation of a function (here, cardio-circulatory) 
means that the function ‘will not restart spontaneously and no medical interventions 
will be conducted to restart it’ [45, p. 314]. The inadequacy of such a test of death 
is patent. First, the fact that circulation will not restart spontaneously is consistent 
with life, as any beneficiary of cardiopulmonary resuscitation will testify. Second, 
the difficulty of knowing whether something will not happen is obvious. The usual 
protocol for permanent cessation is two to five minutes [45, p. 315], yet as is known 
from the Lazarus Phenomenon, spontaneous heartbeat can resume up to (at least) 
ten minutes following prolonged CPR [46]. Given this, if medical intervention will 
not be carried out to restart circulation, the chance of spontaneous autoresuscitation 
is severely diminished and the permanence test becomes, as it were, self-fulfilling. 
Third, why should it matter whether a function is spontaneous, as long as it can be 
supplied artificially? One might as well dismiss amputees as unable to walk because 
they cannot spontaneously regrow a limb. Why bother with a prosthesis?
Suppose, now, that irreversibility is defined as the inability to restore function 
with current technology. The inadequacy of such a definition stares one in the face. 
How could the question of whether a person is literally dead depend on what tech-
nology happens to be around for reviving them? Should one say that an apnoeic 
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drowning victim, being in exactly the same physiological condition in a world with 
the technology of 1650 and in a world with the technology of 2018, would be liter-
ally dead in the former but alive in the latter? Those whose circulation cannot be 
restored with current technology may well be ‘as good as dead’ or on a fast descent 
towards death—but, depending on the circumstances, they may literally be alive.
If irreversibility is defined in terms of lack of restorability of a function with any 
future technology, the fact of death is held hostage to human ingenuity. To be sure, a 
person who is, in fact, dead is not capable of restoration to life using any future tech-
nology—only a miracle could achieve this—but they are not dead because of this 
technological impossibility. Rather, the technological impossibility itself, along with 
the death, is due to the laws of nature. So the question simply becomes one of when 
a function cannot be restored due to the laws of nature. On the hylemorphic theory, 
there is no simple scientific test of this for living things; rather, a metaphysical judg-
ment has to be made concerning the integrity of the organism. Is the organism as a 
whole present and doing what organisms of its type essentially do?
It seems that any other definition of irreversibility will be question begging, 
since it will explicitly or, more likely, implicitly appeal to the very loss of integrity 
about which one is trying to make a determination in the first place. In other words, 
irreversibility in the metaphysical rather than the technological sense—something 
like irreversibility in principle—is a symptom rather than a criterion of death. It 
is because an organism is dead that nothing—whether natural, artificial, present, 
future, or possible—can occur or be performed to restore whatever function, includ-
ing circulation, whose loss one might deem to be as close as one can get to the 
moment of death.
Putrefaction as the only sure sign of death
The second problem with Shewmon’s position concerns his denial of a single, uni-
versally valid sign of death. Yet he recognises that decomposing bodies are certainly 
dead. I contend, given the above discussion, that only putrefaction—the physical 
decomposition of the body—can be a certain sign that death has occurred. Putrefac-
tion is by far the surest sign that, as Shewmon puts it, the ‘anti-entropic processes 
at the basis of life’ [13, p. 466] have disappeared. Physical disintegration is, by its 
very nature, the manifestation of disintegration at the metaphysical level—the loss 
of organismic integrity that must occur if the form has been separated from matter.
Decomposition involves both autolysis—the self-digestion of the organism by 
its own enzymes—and heterolysis, which is the digestion of the organism by inter-
nal and external microbes and other organisms (such as necrophagous insects).30 
The process goes through several stages, beginning with algor mortis, which is the 
changing of the body’s temperature (usually cooling) to match the ambient tempera-
ture, and ending with dry remains, usually teeth and bones. In between are vari-
ous stages, such as rigor mortis—the stiffening of the body—and livor mortis, or 
30 For many details concerning the decomposition process, see [40, ch. 1].
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lividity, which is the settling of the blood, via gravity, to the portions of the body 
closest to the ground.
There is, of course, not a sane observer, professional or not, who would deny 
that such phenomena are certain signs of death.31 So why should these—at least, 
the earliest stages such as algor, rigor, and livor mortis—not be agreed upon as the 
definitive test of death? Such has been the practice in most cultures since the dawn 
of humanity.32 Of rigor mortis, Shewmon says: ‘Rigor mortis is a valid criterion 
far from the moment of death, and therefore not a clinically very useful one’ [41, 
p. 250]. There are two problems with this remark. First, what does ‘far from the 
moment of death’ mean? Rigor mortis, depending on circumstances, can set in as 
early as ten minutes after death [47, p. 75]. Is that far from the moment of death?33 
It would be earlier than many other cases in which anything close to irreversible ces-
sation of cardio-circulatory function occurs. Second, what does ‘clinically not very 
useful’ mean? If it means ‘not useful for knowing whether to attempt resuscitation’, 
putrefaction is eminently useful. If it means ‘not useful for scientific purposes’, then 
a forensic pathologist would keenly disagree.
Perhaps Shewmon means ‘not useful for organ procurement’? In the mouth of 
many other writers on this topic, that would appear the most likely interpretation. 
Organs belonging to a decomposing body are of no clinical use whatsoever. I am 
reluctant, however, to attribute this interpretation to Shewmon, the entire thrust of 
whose writings on this subject runs counter to the eagerness expressed by so many 
clinicians and ethicists to loosen the criterion of death so as to make ‘organ har-
vesting’ easier and more abundant. It may be, though I am not sure, that Shewmon 
is implicitly endorsing circulatory death as a criterion of death for transplantation 
purposes. Perhaps he would want to extend the so-called ‘stand-off’ period to longer 
than five minutes, but he would then be running the risk of undercutting the possi-
bility of transplantation itself, since the longer the interval, the less likely organs are 
31 Lest it be objected that a putrefying body might just be a living body with gangrene, note first that 
gangrene is always localised, with a line of demarcation between necrotic and living tissue: there is no 
‘whole-body’ gangrene. Second, gangrene is always accompanied by inflammation and repair, which are 
absent from a putrefying corpse.
32 When I assert that putrefaction is the only sure sign of death, note that I am talking only about the 
normal or typical case, by which I mean the case where there is a body in the first place. Of course, being 
vaporised from the ankles up is a sure ‘sign of death’, as is the liquefaction of one’s entire head. The 
object is always to identify the sign of loss of integrity. Lack of a body entails lack of bodily integrity. I 
assume that the liquefaction of one’s entire head is a pretty reliable sign of loss of integrity, but brain dis-
appearance is not the same as brain death, so this sort of case gives no comfort to brain death theorists. 
Further, given the gruesome stories that circulated during the French Revolution about headless bodies 
walking and bodiless heads talking (some of this may be apocryphal, but not all), one should not be so 
quick as to assume that the radical separation of major parts of the body is a sure sign of death either, 
unless there is no body to speak of. What is always required is loss of integrity—of which putrefaction is 
the infallible sign. (Thanks to Alex Pruss for pushing me on some of these cases.)
33 This does raise the obvious question: how can we know the time of onset of rigor mortis if we do not 
know with certainty the time of death in the first place? Presumably, the answer is a combination of (i) 
forensic scientists’ use of cardio-respiratory cessation as a proxy for the moment of death and estimations 
based on already-observed intervals between this and rigor mortis; and (ii) experiments performed on 
animals where an indubitably fatal act is performed and time calculations are made.
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to be usable. Given the possibility even with current technology of restoring both 
cardiac and circulatory function after long periods,34 it is all but impossible to know 
what the stand-off period should be. If I am right that decomposition is the only cer-
tain sign of death, there should be no stand-off period at all.
In any case, there can be no doubt that, as far as current technology goes, putre-
faction makes organ harvesting all but impossible. But if it is the only sure sign of 
death, it is also highly likely that, from the beginning of the transplant era in the 
1950s, every single organ donor declared dead has, in reality, been alive and has, 
therefore, been killed for their organs—whether intentionally or not. Put another 
way, it would be hard to come up with a single case where an objective clinician 
could, in all honesty, put his hand on his heart and declare that he is as certain of 
the real death of the so-called ‘dead donor’ before him as he would be of a rotting 
corpse.
My hypothesis would be false were it known to be the case that organs have been 
removed from patients in whom decomposition has, in fact, begun but has not yet 
been detected. After all, autolysis and heterolysis begin microscopically before being 
susceptible to gross observation using either the naked eye or the typical instruments 
of the emergency ward. It is doubtful, though, whether any surgeon has ever let a 
patient’s dying process get that far before beginning the process of organ extraction. 
Quite simply, organs need to be warm, fresh, and either functioning or capable of 
quick restoration of function to be usable in a recipient. In the current state of things, 
this is just not possible when decomposition begins.
Does this mean that organ transplantation can only ever violate the dead donor 
rule? Once again, given current technology, I would assert this to be the case. So, 
it seems, would Robert Truog, who calls the dead donor rule an ‘illusion’, sustain-
ing the idea that a ‘bright line’ can be drawn ‘between the dying process and organ 
procurement’ [48, p. 318]. However, whereas Truog maintains that doctors should 
simply abandon the rule and ensure that patients are comfortable and do not suffer 
when they are killed for their organs, one could hold the reverse. Although there is 
no space to argue for it here, I submit that patients should, quite simply, never be 
killed for their organs.
Conclusion
I have enunciated a strong thesis to the effect that, prior to decomposition, it is cer-
tain that the dead donor rule is always violated given current circumstances. But 
even a weaker claim is serious enough—that there is more than negligible risk that 
the rule is violated. It would take a whole other discussion to evaluate the moral 
rules surrounding the risk of intentionally causing a serious wrong. This is not, in 
my view, a matter in which double-effect reasoning comes into play. The organ har-
vester is acting intentionally: the only question is whether what he is doing is an act 
of intentional homicide or not. If it is objectively uncertain, how serious must the 
34 See further [45, pp. 313–314].
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risk be before he may not act? One can at least postulate that the more serious the 
wrong would be, the more certain it should be that the doctor would not be commit-
ting it. Homicide is the most serious natural evil a person can intentionally bring 
about. I would contend, therefore, that anything other than a negligible risk of com-
mitting it is an impenetrable barrier to action.
Until such time, then, as a way of preserving organ usability in people known to 
be dead—in other words, bodies in whom the decomposition process has begun—is 
discovered, a moratorium should be imposed on all transplants from all but certainly 
living humans who both have made a donation voluntarily35 and—at least if killing 
with consent is still wrongful—remain certainly alive afterwards.
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